Tuesday, August 26, 2014

Intrinsic Value of an Eternal God – Nihilism, Perfectionism, Weird Deities, and Guilty Pleasures

The thesis for this piece is that it would be good for there to be an eternal God. This will not seem controversial enough to merit cloudspace for most believers, and unbelievers may think it equal in interest to how many angels could dance on the head of a pin if angels there were. The question of the intrinsic value of eternal persons is, admittedly, largely a conceptual etude. It is, however, I think of some interest that the proposition can be established with relatively little machinery. It is, in fact, a fairly easy theorem of intrinsic value theory, and depends on almost nothing in the way of theology. For example it ignores any good thing that God might do for human beings.


In my book Hope to God, (https://scribl.com/books/E9HZ8/hope-to-god the argument gets only two paragraphs. Although the chief burden of the book is to argue that hope for the existence of a good God is reasonable, this argument only seeks to establish that the existence of an eternal God (or gods) would be of value, and so at least worth wishing for. Here are the two paragraphs:
In addition, the existence of God guarantees the eternal existence of consciousness and thought. There have been many philosophers who believe that consciousness, or such particular states of consciousness as pleasure, are all that is valuable in the universe. Even if they are not right about this, surely some kinds of consciousness are valuable. This is not a difficult idea to grasp. It is a better thing that Jill have a long and happy life instead of being killed by lightning at age three.
We have good scientific reasons for believing that the career of human consciousness and thought will come to an end in the cosmologically near future – in several million years to be very optimistic. Extraterrestrial thought may last longer. Life may not yet start to evolve for billions of years in some star system just now forming. Eventually, however, the universe will decay beyond the possibility of thinking creatures. That God, and hence consciousness and thought, will survive this would be a good thing. At least there will be some consciousness left in the universe. This will be so even if God is alone in his heaven, without angels or souls for company. I here assume that God’s consciousness is desirable to himself. It is not continuing and overwhelming pain. Traditional theology is not to the contrary and no one would hope for a God who was in eternal agony.
Let me go a little deeper than would be suitable for a book intended for the intelligent general audience. I think the argument is pretty solid, but it is always good to check for weak spots, and the examination may turn up some other points of interest.
A Nihilist Objection
Are there any theories of intrinsic value on which no states or functions of consciousness are valuable? One, although it is a theory of intrinsic value only generously defined, is nihilism in the form that absolutely nothing is intrinsically valuable.
Someone, although not you, might briefly be attracted by the following argument: “Nothing is intrinsically valuable because value is always in the service of some interest or for some further end.” This, of course, leads to infinite regress. Moreover, if we do trace back back the interests or further ends it seems more than likely that we will run across persons and their consciousness somewhere, e.g. “because it makes me happy” or “because it satisfies her desire.” It is not, perhaps, that we will find only persons and their consciousness, but we will certainly find at least persons and consciousness.
The nihilist might respond:
You have shown, at most, only value for a particular person, not intrinsic value of a universal or objective sort. What is it to you or to me that it something is valuable to God? You were supposed to show that God's eternal existence is an intrinsic value, which must surely be a value we must all acknowledge. All you have so far is a value that God acknowledges, and to which we could be entirely indifferent. What need we care about God?

This egoistic (or at least subjectivist) nihilist is right, of course, that he needn't care about God. He might even be mystheistic and wish God ill. The anti-nihilist will point out here, however, that being hated by someone is insufficient to defeat the claim of intrinsicness on behalf of a value. Many philosophers have believed that pleasure felt by any being capable of feeling pleasure is intrinsically valuable and have not conceded defeat in acknowledging that some people want some other people to feel only pain. There is nothing logically impossible in putting yourself in simple, direct opposition to intrinsic value.
Yet in so arguing against the nihilist we have established at most the consistency of the existence of intrinsic value that is not universally endorsed. We have as yet no positive argument for intrinsic value. To reach towards a positive argument, consider a state of consciousness s that A considers more highly desirable than any other state that A could be in at that time. s has no future consequences for A that A considers undesirable. A can and does get into s without any effects at all on any others, now or in the future. It is not even a state that others would object to, be offended by, or feel any uneasiness about if they knew that A was in s. Wouldn't it be a good thing that A should have s? If we could costlessly remove some obstacle preventing A from exercising a choice to be in s, shouldn't we do so?
The nihilist strikes a familiar note in responding:
s may be of value to A, but that does not make it a value for the rest of us. I deny that something's being a value for one and having no effects on others makes it a value full stop. I recognize no “should” such that I should bring about s, even costlessly. I have no relation to A that logically requires me to acknowledge such a “should.”
Perhaps the nihilist is right about this. It will depend upon how thick the concept of “logical requirement” is taken to be. (It may be argued that he has the relation to A that he denies.) What should be clear, however, is that the nihilist's refusal to recognize intrinsic value is part and parcel of a refusal to be involved with morality. It is not an argument against morality or intrinsic value, but only an opting out of the project. Perhaps our nihilist's position is proof against a moral objectivism so imperious as to say that every rational person must accept a specified morality. It offers nothing, however, against an objectivism that contends that if you recognize the possibility of morality, then such and so is going to be intrinsically valuable – that is something that should be, other things being equal.
So if we are willing to accept that some things are valuable in themselves, that consciousness and mind should continue to exist forever should be listed in that column, at least if the existence is not undesired by the being or beings having it. (I do not take this last clause to be sufficient to disqualify the value. An eternal mind with a career of thinking great thoughts, unraveling mathematical mysteries, or working out the history of the universe might well be intrinsically valuable even if that mind, saddened by its loneliness, had a slight preference for its own non-existence. This observation smacks of perfectionism, to which I next turn.)
A Perfectionist Alternative
Putting nihilism aside, perhaps the most plausible value theory to reject all states of consciousness and processes of mind as of intrinsic value is an extreme form of perfectionism. Philosophical perfectionism is not very closely related to the common expression “he is a perfectionist,” typified by getting every aspect of a task just right, often with a pathological expenditure of effort. The perfectionism I will consider here is a theory about intrinsic value. It is that some things are intrinsically valuable even absent an effect on consciousness. Natural candidates include splendid mountains, beautiful sunsets, and complex spider webs. Strong contenders among artifacts include such grand human achievements as Beethoven's Ninth, The Night Watch, and Cantor's Non-denumerability Proof. Perfectionism declares these to be intrinsically valuable.
G.E. Moore asked us to consider a beautiful planet that no one (no sentient being) would ever perceive. Would reality be the better for the existence of this planet? I, for one, would be willing to contribute a few dollars if Moore were collecting on behalf of its existence. I admit that I would do so, however, harboring some concerns that the eye of the beholder-iness of “beautiful” might possibly make this subscription irrational where there never would be any eyes involved. Saving The Night Watch from a fire as the last act of the last member of a dying humanity, would be a perfectionist act.
Many balk at any form of perfectionism. I think we must all reject an extreme perfectionism that would contend that only the paradigmatic perfectionist objects or processes are intrinsically valuable. That there should be a DVD of a wonderful performance of Don Giovanni may possibly be a good thing itself, but it is surely also good that someone should experience it played. It would be nice to see Moore's planet. In short, it seems impossible to deny that thinking and experiencing by beings who can think and experience are at least sometimes intrinsically good.
If we have gotten beyond the all out attack on intrinsic value posed by nihilism and the denial of goodness to any form of thought and consciousness that might possibly be spun out of extreme perfectionism, then to disqualify God's eternal existence from the catalog of the intrinsic goods will have to make use of some specific disqualifying property of God.
Objection that God's Consciousness is Too Different
The first one that comes to mind is that God is not a human being. Perhaps morality is a human institution, created by and serving the interests of we humans and no one else. We could whittle away at this thesis by asking whether Neanderthals or Denisovans are included within our moral circle. Some lower animals, especially your dog, we accept accept as having partial moral standing, and we have no difficulty in thinking that we would owe moral duties to space aliens of the Star Trek sorts.
What about conscious beings very, very unlike us, however? Perhaps as they become more and more unlike us, we can doubt even that whatever they have that comes closest to being like our consciousness should really be counted as consciousness. We do not yet understand our own consciousness very well, and the easy assumption that consciousness would be pretty much the same thing everywhere may well be very wrong. What we regard as being so important about our consciousness may might be something rather particular to the way we evolved on this planet.
So what if God's consciousness were very unlike ours? The tradition assures us that we and God are importantly similar in that we were made in the image of God. On the other hand tradition also tells us that God is omniscient. That alone would make God's mind very different from ours indeed – even if his omniscience did not extend to all truths about the future. (See 6/15/14 “Is the Moving Now an Illusion if God is Omniscient.)
Of course eternal beings need not be very much like God of the traditions. We want to be neutral so far as we can be with respect to theology. So the best I think we can do is to conclude that insofar as a eternal being shares what is the basis for value in our consciousness (even if to a lesser or greater degree than we have it), then it is, other things being equal, intrinsically valuable that such beings exist.
Disqualifying an Evil God
The two paragraphs from my book manuscript, quoted so long ago now, had one footnote. Wanting to presume little in the way of theology, I considered the possibility of an evil god. I have already touched on the problem of a sad eternal god. I suggested that a little sadness would not necessarily make the eternal life of such a God negative if, for example, there was great achievement (even if only mental achievement) along with the modest sadness. Terrible sadness and other negative states of consciousness would be disqualifiers.
An evil god is, of course, could not be farther from our religious traditions, although the Canaan genocides of the Book of Joshua must be read with very substantial pro-Israelite sympathies to believe that the God so described was omnibenevolent. In evaluating the intrinsic value of the eternal existence of evil gods, I will not be concerned with gods that actually do bad things. We are imagining a god in the distant future when there may be no physical reality to do anything bad with. The focus is on the existence of consciousness and thought and so the question is whether evil thought or a wicked thinker is enough to turn the survival of conscious thought from intrinsically good to bad or indifferent.
This seems to me difficult because what makes consciousness in general good and what makes evil thoughts bad are different sorts of things. This shows up in a debate about guilty pleasures of the mind. Consider a favorite pleasurable fantasy of yours that you would just as soon no one ever suspected you harbored. Suppose that there is no possibility whatsoever that this fantasy will ever affect your behavior. There are at least three schools of thought on the value of your fantasy.
One, which we might call the hedonist view, is that it is all to the good. Pleasure is pleasure, and a pleasure that hurts no one gets full credit. The second view is that the pleasure you get must be balanced against whatever features the fantasy has that encourage you to keep it secret. If realization of the fantasy would violate the rights or harm the interests of others or it is simply not a fantasy in which an ideally virtuous person would indulge, then that counts against the value of the fantasy as a state of your consciousness. Whether it has positive net value depends upon the balance of the positive value of the pleasure against the moral negative. That you are “balancing” two things that may be quite different is a conceptual problem, but we do seem to come up with judgments in the end when we “weigh” very different things, whether it is intellectually defensible or not.
The third position on guilty mental pleasures is that the pleasure makes the whole worse. To motivate this, let me briefly leave pure consciousness and consider the case where you cause an injury to someone, perhaps by making a cutting remark. If you take pleasure in your victim's discomfort (Schadenfreude) , that, plausibly, makes things worse. For all you Schopenhauer fans, : “To feel envy is human, to savor schadenfreude is devilish.” (On Human Nature.) But the intuition here is not simply that it is not only that it shows you to be a worse person, but that the taking of pleasure in another's pain is itself intrinsically bad – and the more pleasure is taken, the worse it is. Your pleasure is multiplied by minus one.


If the last of these positions is the correct one, it is going to be difficult for the eternal existence of a thoroughly evil god to be value positive. A god who thinks only evil thoughts, perhaps relishing the extinction of all life and imagining the suffering he would cause were there only some creatures around to torture, would be intrinsically disvaluable no matter how much enjoyment he got from so thinking. If, of course, such thoughts came to him only occasionally, and he was otherwise occupied in thinking beneficient thoughts or doing proofs or composing symphonies, (perhaps the “Thousand Year Symphony”), then accounting would come into play and he might net out positive.
On what I have, too simply, called the hedonist position, a happy eternal will be value positive no matter how vile its thoughts. The middle position, where vileness of a thought is subtracted from pleasurableness, value or not will depend upon the numbers.
So the proposition that the eternal existence of consciousness in deity form is intrinsically valuable does need a footnote for the evil god case for all but the guilty pleasures hedonist. If we take up the issue, as I do in the book, as part of the larger question whether we should hope for the existence of God, the clincher is that no one would hope for an evil god.






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