Deceptive Truth: Kant, Sandel, & Bill Clinton

Occasioned by the suggestion of Sandel that it may sometimes be morally permissible to deceive people, so long as you do so without lying, I here examine such alleged truths as “I did not have sexual relations with that woman.” After setting up the issues in Section 1, in Sections 2-4 I examine questions of language, communication, and truthfulness in assessing whether candidate deceptive truths really are true. These sections require little if any prior familiarity in the area. The fifth section, however, probably will be hard to follow unless you have some acquaintance with Kant’s ethics. Lacking that, you still may well be able to follow the Sections 6-8, and the final section on the Clinton impeachment has no prerequisites.

A Textualist Approach to Legal Interpretation

Here is a draft of a paper on legal interpretation that is similar to origanilism in emphasizing the meaning of the text as enacted, but differs from standard forms of originalism, especially with respect to normative words and phrases in the text and in disavowing as determinative drafter and legislative or ratifier expectation and intent. The first section by itself might be of interest if you are a little uncertain about the difference between ambiguity and vagueness, or types of ambiguity, or what problems of interpretation there are beyond ambiguity and vagueness.