Moral Obligations to the Future

Suppose that something like the classical utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham, were true. I don’t think it is true. However, consequentialist reasoning dominates most policy analysis and discussion, and consequences must play some role in any plausible moral theory. That being so, it is useful to take an unflinching look at what a generalized version of utilitarianism would have to say about the duty of those of us now alive have towards future populations including those of the deep future.

It Is Impossible to Maximize Good Consequences.

In my last post I argued that utility monsters, genocide of the less happy, and barely happy multitudes raise problems for the maximization clause of the fundamental definitions of consequentialism. Looking again to those definitions, as standardly propounded, I am going to argue that it is impossible to maximize good consequences – even in the unlikely event that a coherent account can be given of the choice alternatives and their consequences.

The Consequences for Consequentialism of Utility Monsters and Barely Happy Multitudes

The fundamental definition of maximizing consequentialism is that the objectively right action is the action, among available alternatives, that maximizes net good consequences. Do barely happy multitudes and utility monsters mean that consequentialism so understood cannot provide the fundamental guiding principle of morality?